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 Civil Society and Interest Groups
 in Contemporary Japan
 Yutaka Tsujinaka and Robert Pekkanen*
 Introduction In recent years, there has been a veritable explosion of new writings on civil society in Japan.1 In some ways, this represents a natural extension
 of the general rise over the last two decades in interest in the topic among
 scholars, especially political scientists. In the study of Japan, however, this
 new vein of literature could force a rethinking of widely accepted views
 about the nature of Japanese politics, the role of societal actors and their
 relationship to state power. Accordingly, this article probes the extent to
 which the new literature on civil society should lead to a revised under-
 standing of Japan's political economy and policymaking processes.
 Let us recall the industrial policy and political economy literature
 (hereafter "political economy literature") that reached its heyday in the 1980s
 and 1990s and painted a very different picture of Japan. Despite substantial
 * The authors thank Saadia Pekkanen, Ethan Scheiner, Martha Walsh, the editors and the two
 anonymous referees for comments on this manuscript. We also thank TJ. Pempel, Susan J. Pharr,
 Keiichi Tsunekawa, Jaeho Yeom and especially Takafumi Ohtomo for comments on earlier versions.
 Some of the statistical analyses and results presented in this article appear in a somewhat different
 version in Yutaka Tsujinaka, ed., Nihon no gendai shimin shakai-rieki shuudan [Japan's Contemporary
 Civil Society and Interest Groups] (Tokyo: Bokutakusha, 2002), but our argument here is original.
 1 Recent examples from these pages include Paul Waley, "Ruining and Restoring Rivers: The
 State and Civil Society in Japan," Pacific Affairs, vol. 78, no. 2 (2005) , pp. 195-216; and Apichai Shipper,
 "Foreigners and Civil Society in Japan," Pacific Affairs, vol. 79, no. 2 (2006), pp. 269-289. See also
 Jennifer Chan-Tiberghien, Gender and Human Eights Politics in Japan: Global Norms and Domestic Networks
 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004) ; Koichi Hasegawa, Kankyou undou to atarashii koukyouken -
 kankyou shakaigaku no paasupekuchibu [Environmental Movements and the New Public Sphere: The
 Perspective of Environmental Sociology] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2003); Frank J. Schwartz and Susan J.
 Pharr, eds., The State of Civil Society in Japan [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003]; Susan J.
 Pharr, "Targeting by an Activist State: Japan as a Civil Society Model," in Schwartz and Pharr, eds., The
 State of Civil Society in Japan; Robert Pekkanen, "Japan's New Politics: The Case of the NPO Law,"
 Journal of Japanese Studies, vol. 26, no. 1 (2000), pp. 111-148; Robert Pekkanen, "Molding Japan's Civil
 Society," in Schwartz and Pharr, eds., The State of Civil Society in Japan; Robert Pekkanen, "After the
 Developmental State in Japan," Journal of East Asian Studies, vol. 4, no. 3 (2004), pp. 363-388; Robert
 Pekkanen, "Social Capital without Advocacy," in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Civil Society and Political Change
 in Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004) ; Robert Pekkanen, Japan 'sDual Civil Society: Members
 without Advocates (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006); Stephen P. Osborne, ed., The Nonprofit
 and Voluntary Sector in Japan (London: Routledge, 2003); Tsujinaka, ed., Nihon no gendai shimin shakai-
 rieki shuudan; Yutaka Tsujinaka, "Japan's Civil Society Organizations in Comparative Perspective," in
 Schwartz and Pharr, eds., The State of Civil Society in Japan; Naoki Tanaka, Shimin shakai no borantia
 [Volunteers of Civil Society] (Tokyo: Maruzen, 1996); Jeffrey Kingston, Japan 's Quiet Transformation:
 Social Change and Civil Society in the 21st Century (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004).
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 differences in the views of the authors, two common threads of much of this
 literature were the primacy of the economic bureaucracy and a limited set
 of privileged civil society actors, primarily producers' groups.2 Although
 labour unions were most famously excluded, so were women's organizations,
 minority groups, many consumer groups, environmental advocacy groups
 and many others.3 In fact, ideas such as "bureaucratic dominance," "patterned
 pluralism" and "corporatism without labour" are inextricably premised on
 the exclusion from power of certain political actors. For example, the "pat-
 tern" in "patterned pluralism" shows up because some groups are allowed
 influence and others not. Although authors such as Richard Samuels, Michio
 Muramatsu and Ellis Krauss, and Chalmers Johnson might disagree on the
 precise nature of the power relationships among business, bureaucrats and
 interest groups, the consensus was that economic interests were powerful
 and represented while others were given short shrift.4 Japan was a "producers'
 society," not a "consumers' society," and almost the only groups that really
 mattered were economic interest groups.
 Yet, at several turns, the civil society literature has urged us to consider a
 broader range of actors as politically relevant. Jennifer Chan-Tiberghien
 and Kim Reimann persuasively show how international actors and norms
 can exercise influence through and on domestic civil society groups. Apichai
 Shipper examines groups that support foreign labourers and finds that, at
 least before the state applies itself, they can shape the public sphere. Robert
 Pekkanen insists that even mundane neighbourhood associations can support
 policy implementation, among other policy virtues. Jeffrey Kingston, Koichi
 Hasegawa and Yutaka Tsujinaka recognize the significance of civil society
 actors.5
 2 The locus classicus for the developmental state is Chalmers Johnson, MTTI and the Japanese
 Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982).
 Corporatism in Japan is most famously explored in TJ. Pempel and Keiichi Tsunekawa, "Corporatism
 without Labor? The Japanese Anomaly," in P. Schmitter and G. Lehmbruch, eds., Trends Towards
 Corporatist Intermediation (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979), pp. 231-270. The patterned pluralism citation is
 Michio Muramatsu and Ellis S. Krauss, "The Conservative Policy Line and the Development of Patterned
 Pluralism," in Kozo Yamamura and Yasukichi Yasuba, eds., The Political Economy of Japan, Vol. 1: The
 Domestic Transformation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), pp. 516-554. See also Richard J.
 Samuels on "reciprocal consent" in his book, The Business of the Japanese State (Ithaca: Cornell University
 Press, 1987).
 3 On labour, see Pempel and Tsunekawa, "Corporatism without Labor?" For women and minority
 groups, see Susan J. Pharr, Losing Face: Status Politics in Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press,
 1992). For consumer groups, see Patricia Maclachlan, Consumer Politics in Postwar Japan (New York:
 Columbia University Press, 2002) . For minority and environmental groups, see Frank Upham, Law
 and Social Change in Postwar Japan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).
 4 Samuels, The Business of the Japanese State; Muramatsu and Krauss, "The Conservative Policy
 Line"; Johnson, MTTI and the Japanese Miracle.
 5 Chan-Tiberghien, Gender and Human Rights Politics in Japan; Kim Reimann, "Building Global
 Civil Society from the Outside In? Japanese International Development NGOs, the State, and
 International Norms," in Schwartz and Pharr, eds., The State of Civil Society in Japan; Shipper^ "Foreigners
 and Civil Society in Japan"; Pekkanen, "Molding Japan's Civil Society," "Social Capital without Advocacy,"
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 Although studies of civil society have augmented our comprehension of
 Japanese politics, observers may be left wondering what is going on. Have
 traditionally powerful economic interest groups been eclipsed by newer civil
 society organizations, or simply lost their influence altogether? Conversely,
 while we know of the rising importance of civil society groups, how do they
 stack up to the economic interest groups that attracted so much attention in
 the scholarship of the 1980s and early 1990s? In fact, the relationship between
 newer civil society organizations, such as citizens' groups (shimin dantai in
 Japanese), and the older economic interest groups has not been made clear
 because much of this new literature does not directly speak to earlier analyses
 of Japanese policy making and polity, which often focused on the role of
 groups in the making of industrial policy. Studies of civil society seldom
 challenge earlier understandings of the influence of the bureaucracy, and
 indeed Robert Pekkanen sees the state and bureaucracy as influential.6 By
 invoking the idea that other actors have influence, however, these studies at
 least implicitly raise the issue.
 Our argument in this article is not that these recent analyses of civil society
 are incorrect; many are compelling and have enriched our understanding
 of Japan. Rather, we seek to place these two literatures - the older work on
 political economy and the more recent writings on civil society - in
 perspective. Without such a linking perspective, it is difficult to weigh the
 relative merits of these conceptions. Do the civil society and political economy
 strands of analysis of Japan differ in emphasis only because of the interest of
 the authors, or do they disagree about the relative power of these groups?
 And, how would we compare the importance of new civil society groups with
 traditional economic groups? Because of the nature of our evidence, we are
 able in this article to make some systematic comparisons. We hope this will
 help to connect current research agendas more systematically with well-
 developed earlier themes.
 This article has two main goals. First, it provides a macro-level overview
 that covers both economic interest groups and other civil society organi-
 zations. We present a broad picture of the influence of interest groups on
 public policy and policy making in Japan based on statistical analysis of the
 Japan Interest Group Survey (JIGS) , as detailed in the next section. Such an
 approach naturally has its strengths and limitations. As we discuss the
 particular methodology employed, we comment specifically on the limitations
 to our study. In general, however, a survey can complement more detailed
 studies of particular policy areas. Moreover, a survey of a very broad range of
 and Japan 'sDual Civil Society; Kingston, Japan 's Quiet Transformation; Hasegawa, Kankyou undou to atarashii
 koukyouken; Miranda Schreurs, Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany, and the United States (Cambridge:
 Cambridge University Press, 2002); and Tsujinaka, ed., Nihon no gendai shimin shakai-rieki shuudan.
 6 Pekkanen, Japan 's Dual Civil Society.
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 civil society actors across issues can provide perspective that is not available
 through case studies - even excellent and thorough ones - limited to a
 particular issue area or type of group. Our aim in this article is to provide
 such a comprehensive survey of the involvement of civil society groups in
 policy making in Japan in order to address the important questions raised
 above.
 As a second goal, in this article we hope to link the literatures on economic
 interest groups and civil society and in so doing to place the achievements
 of civil society groups in perspective. Because the comparative analysis we
 attempt can systematically detect differences across sectors or types of interests
 by a multisectoral or macro-level overview, our results show that the tradition-
 ally powerful economic interest groups are stronger and more influential
 than the new civil society groups and citizens' groups. We do not seek to
 demean the real and important achievements of civil society - our objective
 is not to demonstrate the powerlessness of civil society groups (and thus
 provide a convenient straw man for future graduate students) . Instead, we
 hope our findings here will compare the accomplishments and influence of
 economic interest groups with other civil society groups in order to provide
 a comparative perspective on their respective influence in the Japanese
 policymaking process. In a systematic analysis of Japan, we find that Japanese
 associational structure is characterized by the pronounced strength of
 economic or business organizations compared to other groups. This is true
 when we look at the number of groups, the size or resources of the
 organizations and the success that economic groups have in gaining access
 to policy makers.
 In this article, we conceive of economic interest groups as a powerful
 subset of civil society organizations, and the term "interest groups" here
 should be seen as differentiating those civil society groups that have direct
 ties to an economic interest. Specifically, we use "interest groups" to refer to
 economic interest groups such as industry associations, groups representing
 a specific profession (e.g., the Japan Medical Association), labour unions
 and agricultural cooperatives (all these types have separate categories in the
 survey itself) . This distinguishes these groups from a larger set of "civil society
 organizations," which may advocate for policy change but do not directly
 represent an economic interest such as that of farmers, workers or automobile
 manufacturers. Occasionally, in the same sentence we will refer to "interest
 groups" in contrast to "civil society organizations," in which case the reader
 should understand the latter as shorthand for "civil society groups other
 than interest groups."
 A more detailed description of our methodology follows this introduction.
 After this, we plunge into the substantive analysis of the article. We focus on
 three main aspects. First, we distinguish between the types of groups that
 involve themselves in policy making. These groups are broken down in the
 JIGS survey by their predominant activity (e.g., agricultural groups, sports
 422
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 groups) and their legal status. Second, we investigate the policy areas that
 interest the JIGS organizations. We spend the bulk of our efforts, however,
 in probing how civil society groups seek to influence. This includes detailing
 the concrete activities and steps taken to influence policy and specifying the
 political actors targeted for influence. We also include in this category details
 such as whether the groups offered electoral support or provided
 postretirement jobs to bureaucrats and whether they focused their efforts
 on politicians or bureaucrats. In the conclusion, we investigate the success
 the groups have in gaining access to political actors. We also draw out
 implications for the study of interest groups and civil society in Japan and
 for a more general understanding of Japanese politics.
 Methodology: A note on the JIGS survey
 The evidence is drawn from the JIGS survey of interest groups conducted
 by Yutaka Tsujinaka. This extensive survey involved 36 questions and 260
 subquestions and utilized random sampling of the Nippon Telephone and
 Telecommunications Town Page (shokugyoubetsu denwachou), the "NTT
 telephone book." The directory listed all groups that held a phone line and
 did not request an unlisted number. Almost every group that held a phone
 line was listed in the NTT telephone book. Of course, not all groups
 necessarily have their own telephone lines, but this method of sampling
 allows the research to include groups that had not obtained legal status or
 did not even have their own office. In this way, the JIGS data are more
 comprehensive than government data and catch many groups that would
 otherwise be uncounted.
 The NTT telephone book is a comprehensive listing of telephone numbers
 and includes the useful category of "unions and associations" in which most
 organizations that are not corporations list their numbers. There are no
 significant competing categories that might siphon off portions of the
 population of organizations and thus create bias in the survey itself. There
 are also no categories or types of groups that should be systematically
 underrepresented in the NTT telephone book. In the 1997 editions used
 for this survey, there were 21,366 organizations listed in Tokyo and 1,762 in
 Ibaraki Prefecture (a rural and traditionally conservative prefecture north
 of Tokyo in the Kan to area) ; these 23,128 organizations were the population
 of the JIGS survey. School legal persons (private schools) , social welfare legal
 persons and medical legal persons were excluded from the survey (legal
 personality refers to officially recognized incorporation as a legal entity) .
 Religious groups such as churches and temples were also excluded, although
 associations that represent religious groups were included, as were religious
 groups not involved in a religious mission (e.g., YMCA). Cooperatives were
 included in the survey. As can be seen, groups that fit common definitions
 of interest groups were all included, and we hope our specificity about the
 423
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 data will allow readers with different operating definitions of civil society to
 still seek insights from this analysis.
 The JIGS team employed random sampling and used the postal service
 to send out questionnaires. Mailed questionnaires hold several advantages.
 The cost is relatively low compared to other forms of gathering data from
 organizations. In addition, using such a method allowed us to broaden the
 sample size far beyond what we could have done with detailed case studies,
 or even interviews; using these questionnaires, we were able to conduct large-
 N research. One prime disadvantage to mailing survey questionnaires is that
 the rate of response can be so low as to call the results into question. However,
 the JIGS survey enjoyed a very high return rate (40 percent average) and a
 very high response rate (more than 70 percent). In this survey, the team
 sent questionnaires to 4,247 organizations (3,866 in Tokyo and 381 in Ibaraki)
 and had 1,635 returns (1,438 from Tokyo and 197 from Ibaraki). The head
 of the organization or the person in charge of administrative matters usually
 answered the questionnaire. The valid return rate was 37.2 percent in Tokyo
 and 51.7 percent in Ibaraki. We received responses from groups that make
 up 6.7 percent of all groups listed in the telephone directory in Tokyo and
 11.2 percent in Ibaraki. These are quite large samples.
 The JIGS survey included questions specifically designed to reveal the
 policy influence and interests of the target groups. We discuss these results
 below. Moreover, we can investigate these data along with a fairly detailed
 profile of the group, including the type of group, its legal status and the size
 of the group.
 Given this methodology, we are confident that the JIGS results are fair
 and representative of interest groups and civil society groups in Japan - at
 least as defined by the parameters of the survey. What kind of groups
 responded to the JIGS survey? In other words, what do we know about the
 civil society organizations whose influence on policy is the subject of study
 in this article? We address these questions in the following section.7
 Surveys similar to JIGS have been conducted in several other countries:
 Korea, the United States, Germany, China, Russia, Turkey and the Philippines
 during the 1997-2005 period. For maximum comparability, the surveys are
 similar in format and methodology to the JIGS survey. Naturally, where
 necessary the surveys were tailored to local conditions, and response rates
 and patterns varied across countries. We reference these studies occasionally
 for illustration, but forgo details in the interest of space and because they
 are not central to our arguments below.
 7 Readers might ask what has happened since the survey was conducted. Without systematic
 data, we can only speculate or at best construct plausible hypotheses. Fortunately, the JIGS team will
 conduct a second survey of organizations in the near future to examine changes that have occurred.
 424
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 Who? What kind of civil society organizations influence policy?
 In this section, we provide an overview of the contours of civil society in
 Japan. We see that economic interest groups are more prevalent as a
 proportion of all civil society groups in Japan than in other countries.
 Moreover, comparing Japanese economic interest groups with other types
 of civil society groups in Japan, we see that interest groups have vastly greater
 organizational resources, such as finances and staff. Although this alone is
 far from conclusive, we take it as evidence consistent with the earlier political
 economy literature's view of Japan.
 Types of Groups
 We present first an overview of the distribution of types of groups to
 demonstrate the dominance of economic groups, both vis-a-vis other types
 of groups domestically, and also in comparative perspective. Here, the data
 are broken down by the predominant activity or area of the groups, as self-
 reported. In the JIGS survey, organizations were asked to identify themselves
 in one of 1 1 classifications created by the survey team: agricultural, business,8
 labour, educational, administrative, welfare, professional, political, citizens
 (shimin dantai), religious and other.
 Figure 1 reports the distribution of JIGS groups in Japan9 and places this
 breakdown in comparative perspective by providing similar figures for Russia,
 Figure 1:
 Comparison of Distribution of Groups in Five Countries by Type and %
 8 This category includes business groups, trade associations, industry associations and the like.
 9 For Japan, the reader will note a large other section and perhaps wonder if many
 noneconomic organizations are hidden in that category. Organizations that self-reported "other" in
 425
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 Korea, the United States and Germany. The figure shows the preponderance
 of business organizations in Japan and how the share of business organizations
 is higher in Japan than elsewhere.
 Distribution of Organizational Resources
 An analysis of the distribution of groups is a necessary step to understand
 the structure of civil society in Japan. However, an analysis of the different
 resources available to types of groups reveals patterns that cast light on our
 animating question of the relative power of interest groups and other civil
 society organizations. Of the 11 types of groups in the JIGS survey, business
 organizations had far greater access to resources. For example, only 5.1 percent
 of citizens' groups had budgets greater than US$1 million per year, versus
 40.9 percent of business organizations. Similarly, 42.7 percent of business
 organizations had more than five full-time staff members, but only 18.8
 percent of citizens' groups did. Citizens' groups are an especially apt category
 to compare with business groups when we keep in mind the literatures cited
 above on economic interest groups and civil society organizations. "Citizens'
 groups" was a self-defined category in the JIGS survey, as indeed it is more
 generally in con temporary Japan. The category implies the most independent
 type of civil society organizations, perhaps the closest to what North
 Americans would consider "real civil society" groups. Resources alone do
 not necessarily translate into power in all cases. To compare interest groups
 and civil society groups, however, an important first step is to identify the
 number of groups and their resources in a directly comparable manner. So
 far, our evidence is consistent with the political economy view of Japan.
 What? In which policy issues are civil society organizations involved?
 Now that we have an idea of who the civil society actors are, we turn to
 their involvement in a range of issues. We want to determine whether groups
 care about policy and policy making, and we investigate this "involvement"
 in terms of (1) self-reported expression of interest in an issue, (2) different
 activities engaged in on an issue and (3) relationships with various other
 political actors. The JIGS survey has a number of questions and subquestions
 that allow us to disaggregate this concept and quantify involvement at a
 variety of levels. We report in this section on interests and in the next section
 on activities and relationships with other political actors.
 Ql of the JIGS survey were further asked to specify their type of organization. The breakdown of this
 "other" category is consistent with the overall JIGS survey. One hundred of the 417 "other" groups
 chose not to respond, but "commerce and industry" took the plurality (68) of those who did.
 426
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 Interest in an Issue
 One fairly low threshold of involvement is whether organizations reported
 an interest in a particular issue. One survey question at this level of
 involvement broke down 22 areas of policy and asked: "Among national and
 local public policies, which policy or activity areas are you interested in?"
 One of the main findings presented in this article is that nearly all of the
 organizations responded that they were interested in one of the 22 public policy areas.
 Recall that the organizations we examined were selected randomly from a
 telephone directory and that they were by no means necessarily well known.
 Such a result implies strongly that all of these organizations had an interest
 in public policy. This important finding further implies that civil society
 organizations in general have an interest in public policy. Moreover, this helps
 us to compare interest groups and civil society groups. After all, if certain
 types of groups were not at all interested in policy, lack of access to policy
 makers might not be important for them. However, the near-universal interest
 in policy implies that the vastly differential involvement in policy making
 that we see in the next section is more consequential.
 We also were able to investigate the intersection of group type with interest
 in particular public policy issue areas. In other words, we can see what kinds
 of groups are interested in which kinds of policies or which kinds of policies
 interest which groups. One fairly predictable result of this analysis is that
 organizations were particularly interested in the public policy issues close to
 their predominant activity. For example, 97 percent of agricultural
 organizations were interested in agricultural policies, nearly all labour
 organizations (95 percent) were interested in labour policies and welfare
 organizations (91 percent) were interested in welfare policies.
 A Bigger Public far Some Public Policies
 Another less intuitive result is that there are some issue areas in which
 most groups express an interest. For example, most organizations have policy
 interests in welfare, environment and finance. A diverse set of organizations
 showed a high interest in environmental policy (political organizations, 59
 percent; citizens' organizations, 57 percent; business organizations, 44
 percent; professional organizations, 42 percent; labour organizations, 40
 percent; and agricultural organizations, 40 percent) . Generally, in Tokyo,
 many organizations showed interest in new policies related to civic activities
 such as welfare, environment, education/sports, international and
 consumers. Next were policies related to the economy and special interests
 such as industry, finance, money, international trade and industry, regional
 development, telecommunication and construction. On the other hand,
 organizations' interests toward traditionally state-related policies such as
 foreign policy, human rights, security and public safety were relatively low.
 There was a fairly clear hierarchy of how "general" or widespread was the
 427
This content downloaded from 130.158.56.51 on Mon, 15 Jan 2018 07:54:58 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Pacific Affairs: Volume 80, No. 3 -Fall 2007
 interest piqued by policies. It is tempting to wonder if some policy areas
 more clearly provide public goods than others, or if they simply affect more
 constituencies.
 Specialist and Generalist Organizations
 Looking at organizations instead of policies, we can classify some organi-
 zations as "specialists," because they care only about one type of issue, and
 others as "generalists," who care about a broad variety of issues. Generalist
 organizations show interest in more than five policy issue areas. By type of
 group, they were most prominent among political (69 percent), labour (61
 percent) and business (56 percent) organizations. However, 40 percent of
 citizen, professional, agricultural and educational organizations, and less
 than 30 percent of administrative and welfare organizations showed interest
 in more than five policy areas.
 Geographic Scale of Activities
 Groups active in some issue areas were more likely to be purely local
 players, while other policy areas (or types of groups) were active on the
 national stage. To probe the geographic scale on which groups were active,
 the JIGS survey broke the geographic scale into local level (shichouson) ,
 prefectural level, regional (multiple prefectures) , national and international.
 The scale of an organization's activities seemed to have a relationship to the
 types of issues the group expressed interest in. For example, groups that
 claimed operation on an international level expressed interest in inter-
 national cooperation issues (kokusai kyouryoku) (67.2 percent) and foreign
 policy (22.9 percent), but groups that operated only on a prefectural level
 expressed little interest in international cooperation issues (13.7 percent)
 or foreign policy (5.2 percent). Groups active on the national level were in
 general not very interested in international issues. For example, foreign policy
 (7.8 percent) and national security policy (6.5 percent) are among the least
 popular policy issues among the organizations surveyed, ranking along with
 legal and human rights policies (7.7 percent).
 We also found that groups that operated on different scales relied on
 different sources of information. For example, local groups relied more on
 other groups than any other source of information, followed closely by local
 governments. On the other hand, groups active on an international scale
 relied on specialists more than any other information source and very little
 on local governments.
 How? What means do civil society organizations use to influence policy?
 Interest is one thing, but taking action is quite another. In this section, we
 use the JIGS data to investigate the specifics of how civil society organizations
 act in the policymaking process. We also probe the relationships that the
 428
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 JIGS groups had with other political actors. Here we are able to compare
 the access that economic interest groups and noneconomic groups had to
 policy makers. All told, we find that economic organizations had much more
 contact with policy makers than did other types of civil society groups. Overall,
 the policy economy models of the 1980s literature seem surprisingly robust.
 Activities an an Issue
 The JIGS survey detailed how groups try to influence policy making.
 Although interest in policy issues is universal, only about half of the groups
 were active in lobbying in more than one issue area. The JIGS survey asked
 about seven types of activities, and if a group reported activity in one of the
 issue areas, its answer counted as expressing action or activity on that issue.
 The activities were contacting the ruling party, contacting the opposition
 party, contacting the central bureaucracy, holding a mass meeting, running
 an opinion ad in the mass media, holding a press conference and forming
 an alliance or coalition with other groups. This list does not include all
 possible forms of political participation (for example, it excludes protests),
 but it is fairly broad (see table 1). Nearly half (43 percent) of all civil society
 organizations were actively involved in policymaking processes as an interest
 group or a pressure group. Moreover, 10 to 20 percent of the groups showed
 active support with a clear political party preference on issues related to
 election campaign, party contact, policy proposal, budget activities and
 Table 1:
 Type of Political Activity by Percentage of Groups Engaged in It
 Type of activity % of groups engaged
 Political aim 56
 Public enlightenment 27
 Policy recommendation 1 7
 Defending rights 26
 Cooperative relationship with. the administration 14
 Lobby central bureaucracy through politicians 31
 Lobby local governments through politicians 27
 Lobby local or national government through politicians 38
 Contact ruling party 16
 Contact mass media 16
 Overall lobbying 43
 coalitions with other groups 8
 mass gatherings 6
 paid advertisements 4
 Offer jobs to retiring bureaucrats 10
 Election campaigning 15
 mobilize members for voting 1 1
 provide staff support for election campaign 5
 429
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 advisory council (shingikai) participation. Overall, we find that political and
 agricultural organizations were the most active in policy making, followed
 by labour, civic and business organizations. We turn to a more detailed analysis
 below.
 Relationship to Other Political Actors
 Politics involves working with other political actors. The JIGS survey also
 asked a number of questions designed to measure the relationship between
 civil society organizations and other political actors, including the central
 bureaucracy, local government and local and national politicians, of course,
 but also with other occasional political actors such as academics, mass media,
 welfare organizations and other civil society organizations. The question
 posed to the JIGS groups was, "What kind of a relationship does this
 organization have to yours? Please answer on a 7 point scale from 'highly
 oppositional' to 'very cooperative.'" An entity that every JIGS group reported
 as having a very cooperative relationship to its own scored a perfect 7, and
 conversely an entity reported as oppositional to all JIGS groups scored a 1.
 More generally, scores over 4 meant that entities' relationships with the JIGS
 groups were more cooperative than adversarial. We review these figures only
 for groups active at the national level. The only type of group to score under
 4 was foreign interest groups. On the other hand, the entity reported as
 having the most cooperative relationship with the JIGS groups was the central
 bureaucracy (4.67) , followed by academics (4.54) , local governments (4.48) ,
 mass media (4.44), welfare organizations (4.39), political parties (4.35) and
 big business (4.29). However, the standard deviation for the bureaucracy
 was higher than for any other entity (1.19); thus, we need to look at the
 relationship between the bureaucracy and other individual organizations
 separately. The organizations most cooperative with the bureaucracy
 considered themselves administrative organizations (5.15), and next were
 business organizations (4.91) and agricultural organizations (4.86), followed
 by professional organizations (4.68) and groups involved in welfare (4.63)
 and education. Groups that identified themselves as citizens' groups were
 much less likely (4.08) to consider their relationship with the bureaucracy
 as cooperative, followed by political organizations (4.00) , which were neutral,
 and labour organizations, which were the only groups to view the bureaucracy
 antagonistically (3.36).
 Bureaucrats the Favourite Target for Lobbying
 The introduction pointed out that bureaucratic power was a staple of the
 earlier political economy literature. Like the new civil society literature, this
 article is less concerned with investigating that tenet than in the primacy of
 economic interests. However, we do find some evidence for the continued
 importance of bureaucrats. The JIGS survey lets us examine the group
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 (bureaucracy, political party or courts) targeted by organizations active in
 various geographical areas to press their claims. A JIGS question asked, "When
 you try to make your organization's opinion heard or defend the interest of
 your organization, which one of the three (bureaucracy, political party and
 courts) do you think is most effective to contact?" We broke the responses to
 this question down by the scale of activity for the organizations (local to
 international). At every level, the bureaucracy was targeted as the most
 effective to contact by a substantial margin, followed by political parties and
 the courts. This also provides support for the political economy view.
 A closer look reveals a few patterns within those broad trends. For example,
 organizations active regionally tended to choose political parties more than
 those with different scopes of activity. Organizations active at city/ town/
 village levels and regional areas targeted the courts more than other
 organizations. The gap between the administration and political parties
 becomes the smallest for organizations that operate regionally. The reason
 organizations covering regional areas did not choose the administration is
 perhaps because there is no institution to cover such an unconventional
 area - Japan has no regional governments.
 Who Meets Whom?
 We also examined in greater detail the relationship the JIGS organizations
 had with state administrative organizations at the national and local levels.
 When JIGS organizations and the administration engaged in interaction,
 who met whom? The survey asked, "When your organization directly contacts
 the bureaucracy, whom (rank) do you meet?" For contacting the national
 bureaucracy, we provided four levels to choose from: minister/bureau
 director, chief, chief clerk and rank and file. Choices at the local level were
 head, chief, chief clerk and rank and file. If at least one of the positions out
 of four were chosen, we considered that the organization had contact with
 the bureaucracy.10 These are the results reported as the first question in
 table 2.
 The survey also asked a series of questions regarding the relationships of
 the JIGS groups with the state administrative organizations and with local
 government. The questions are summarized in table 2, along with the
 percentage of JIGS groups that reported such a relationship at either the
 national or local level. For example, although the first question asked JIGS
 groups to report interaction with the government at either the local or
 national level, 72.6 percent of groups had some interaction at one level or
 the other. We explore these patterns in more detail shortly. What stands out
 10 The original question asked the frequency of contact, but here we do not break down by
 frequency. Organizations can be divided into those that had contact and those that did not. Even
 organizations that did not have much contact are considered as "having contact."
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 Table 2:
 Relationship of JIGS Organizations to National and Local Bureaucracy
 'Yes" at 'Yes" at
 Question national level local level
 Do you have some interaction with the government? 58.4 46.3
 Does the bureaucracy have permitting authority? 37.3 21.6
 Does it regulate your activities? 32.6 18.6
 Does it give your organization administrative
 guidance? 44.5 25.7
 Do you support and cooperate in the policymaking
 and budgetmaking processes? 13.9 9.7
 Do you exchange information regarding
 organization and industries? 35.0 23.4
 Do you send your organization members to
 advisory committees? 13.0 9.0
 Do you offer jobs to retired bureaucrats? 8.4 2.9
 Do you receive grants or subsidies? 13.5 10.8
 is the fairly high percentage of groups that reported receiving administrative
 guidance (44.5 percent). This figure is higher than the number of groups
 that reported their activities were regulated by the bureaucracy. Of course,
 groups' perception of this regulation could vary, but their ability to discern,
 and therefore report, administrative guidance was likely very high. In
 addition, the JIGS organizations probably reported quite accurately on topics
 such as sending their members to advisory committees, offering jobs to retired
 bureaucrats and receiving grants or subsidies. For these national figures, it
 is interesting to note that the ratio of groups offering jobs to bureaucrats to
 groups getting subsidies is about 1:2.
 National and Local Contact Patterns
 Some organizations had stronger relationships or more frequent
 interaction with either local government or the national government. In
 fact, our analysis reveals four contact patterns: (1) contact both the central
 government and local government, (2) contact only the central government,
 (3) contact only the local government and (4) contact neither. Contact
 patterns differed greatly according to area of activity. Organizations active
 in city/ town/ village and in prefectural levels tended to contact local
 governments only, while national-level organizations contacted the state only.
 Many organizations active on the regional and international levels tended
 to contact both the national state and local governments. This may be due
 to the fact that activity areas and (administrative) regions do not match.
 Less than 30 percent of organizations did not contact either level of
 government, local or central.
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 Direct and Indirect Contact
 Organizations contacted the administration not only directly but also
 indirectly. In order to grasp how organizations contacted the administration
 indirectly, we asked, "Whom do you ask to contact the administration?" The
 choices are (1) Diet members from the local district, (2) Diet members not
 from the local district and (3) chief of the municipality and local assembly
 persons. To contact local government, the choices were (1) Diet members,
 (2) prefectural or city assembly persons and (3) powerful people in the area.11
 In general, the most popular answer for indirect contact was "Diet members
 not from the local district." However, 24 percent of respondents chose this
 answer, a much smaller percentage than those relying on "direct contact."
 Organizations active at prefectural and regional levels contacted local Diet
 members, while those active at regional and national levels contacted Diet
 members not from the district. Organizations active on the regional level
 also contacted chiefs and local representatives. These results show that in
 order to influence Diet members, the area of activity needed to be large.
 Moreover, those that had indirect contact with political parties tended to
 use politicians (Diet members, local representatives, chiefs). Some
 organizations attempted direct contact with the administration but also asked
 politicians to contact the administration. The percentage of indirect contact
 with local governments through politicians (11 to 23 percent) was not as
 large as direct contact (46.3 percent). Organizations active at prefectural
 and city/ town/village levels tended to contact local representatives.
 The JIGS survey also asked about consultations regarding policy between
 the government and the JIGS organizations: "Do national and local
 administrative organizations contact your organization to ask for advice
 concerning the making and enforcement of a particular policy? If so, please
 list all the organizations that contacted you." Among organizations active at
 the national level (690), 240 (34.8 percent) wrote names of specific
 organizations that contacted them. Moreover, of those 240 organizations,
 62 (25.9 percent) listed more than one organization (maximum 5).12
 Richard Samuels and others who emphasized the close communication
 between business and government would not be surprised by the results: we
 see that the dominant pattern of civil society-state contact is that between
 business and the economic bureaucracy.13 In fact, consultations (45 between
 11 Again, the original question asked the frequency of contact. Organizations that did not have
 much contact are considered as "having contact."
 12 If an organization answered several related organizations of the same ministry, we did not
 consider that the organization had close relations with multiple administrative organizations. Because
 the survey was conducted by free reply model by mail, there were some inconsistencies with the
 replies. Some were too general but others were very detailed with specific names. Hence, the
 measurement of this reply cannot be as rigorous as some other responses.
 13 Samuels, The Business of the Japanese State.
 433
This content downloaded from 130.158.56.51 on Mon, 15 Jan 2018 07:54:58 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Pacific Affairs: Volume 80, No. 3 - Fall 2007
 the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry [METI] and economic, business
 or trade organizations alone) between economic organizations and economic
 ministries number three times more than all consultations of any ministry
 to citizens' groups, political groups and welfare groups combined (14).
 Moreover, the economic ministries, in particular METI, engaged in contact
 more frequently than other ministries. They made 83 consultations, versus
 only one for the Defense Agency, four for the Environmental Agency and 14
 for the Ministry of Labour. Similarly, economic organizations engaged in
 the most consultations. They engaged in 97 consultations with 17 ministries
 or agencies. We see here the clear dominance of economics in interactions
 between JIGS organizations and the government.
 Another result that stands out is the emergence of "specialists" and
 "generalists." Educational groups, for example, are specialists. They engaged
 in 28 consultations, but most were with the Ministry of Education (86.4
 percent) , and only with the Ministry of Education did they engage in
 consultation more than once. Other specialists are agricultural organizations,
 which have close relationships with the Ministry of Forestry and Fishery and
 its related organizations. Almost all consultations between agricultural
 organizations and government involved the Ministry of Forestry and Fishery
 (91.7 percent) . Similarly, economic organizations tended to be involved with
 METI (68.2 percent of contacts) and welfare organizations with the Ministry
 of Welfare and its related organizations (66.7 percent). On the other hand,
 citizens' groups engaged six times in consultations with separate ministries
 or agencies. They are "generalists," and lonely ones at that.
 Business groups had more contact with bureaucrats for two reasons. First,
 they tended to be larger than other types of organizations, especially when
 compared with citizens' groups. And, larger groups tended to have greater
 access to policy makers in general, for the obvious reason that they were
 more readily seen as influential and important. For example, regardless of
 the type of group, groups with 30-49 employees were about 10 times as
 likely to report regular meetings with top bureaucrats (kyokuchou level and
 above) as groups with fewer than 10 employees. More resources did translate
 into more access. Second, even controlling for resources, business groups
 were relatively advantaged. For example, business groups with 30 to 49
 employees were almost six times more likely than the average to report
 frequent meetings with top bureaucrats.
 The bureaucracy, of course, is not the only political actor to lobby in
 Japan. Although many JIGS organizations worked with the local and national
 bureaucracies, relatively few chose to contact political parties. Figure 2 depicts
 the pattern in which some groups oriented toward political parties while
 others worked closely with the bureaucracy. Most organizations interacted
 only with the bureaucracy (38.2 percent), while almost none chose to work
 only with political parties (5.4 percent). Of course, many groups contacted
 the bureaucracy and political parties (34.4 percent). However, this finding
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 Figure 2:
 Interactions ofJ-JIGS Organizations with Political Actors
 underscores the centrality of the bureaucracy to the lives ofJIGS organizations
 and to the policymaking process in general. To some extent, this finding
 can also be interpreted as providing evidence for the older political economy
 literature that stressed the importance of bureaucrats in policy making.14
 The JIGS survey also asked groups about their sources of information.
 Examining data only for groups that operate on a national level, we asked
 groups to rank from 1 to 12 the most important sources of information for
 their organization from a list: national bureaucracy, group members, other
 groups, specialist publication, the mass media, scholars, corporations, local
 government, local politicians, national politicians, political parties and other
 sources. The results indicate again the tight connections between business
 organizations and the government. Business organizations rated the national
 bureaucracy as their most important source of information. By contrast, for
 citizens' groups, the national bureaucracy ranked fifth, and the mass media
 ranked at the top of the list. In this respect, at least, there appeared to be a
 closer relationship between business and bureaucracy, with citizens' groups
 on the outside, looking in.
 Conclusion
 We have discussed the wide range of policy interests ofJIGS organizations
 and examined in some detail their activities and efforts toward influencing
 the policymaking process. How successful have those efforts been? Stated
 more broadly, how much do interest groups or civil society organizations
 influence the policymaking process in Japan?
 14 See, for example, Johnson, MTTI and the Japanese Miracle.
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 We begin with some caveats and revisit our discussion of the strengths and
 weaknesses of the JIGS survey. The JIGS survey is not an ideal instrument
 through which to measure policy change. It measures and reports the
 perceptions of the organizations, not policy change per se. It also relies on how
 organizations view the policymaking process, rather than examining through
 process tracing what happens. In this sense, case studies are superior to the
 JIGS survey in evaluating the influence of civil society organizations on policy
 making in Japan. However, the JIGS survey also has some concomitant
 advantages due to its scope and scale. It covers a wide range of issue areas
 and organizations. Moreover, taking advantage of the surveys in other
 countries mentioned above, we can make tentative cross-national comparisons.
 The JIGS survey asked groups to report on achieving success in influencing
 (or changing) policy, but only 14.3 percent of JIGS organizations reported
 such success. This was lower than in Korea, less than half of what German
 organizations reported (32.5 percent) in the German version of the JIGS
 survey and a third of what Russian organizations reported (46.5 percent) in
 the Russian version. Japanese groups also reported little success (6.5 percent)
 in blocking policies. Again, this was less than Korean groups (11.1 percent)
 and much less than the Russian (21.2 percent) and German groups (26.3
 percent). At least in terms of groups' perception of their own success,
 Japanese groups did not have much influence over policy making in absolute
 or comparative terms.
 Another question in the JIGS survey asked organizations to evaluate other
 actors' influence over policy: "How much influence do groups listed below
 have on Japanese politics? Please rate from the scale of 1 to 7 (7 being the
 strongest)." Although this necessarily relies on perceptions rather than an
 "objective" measure of real influence, these groups are often intimately
 involved in the policymaking process and have a good sense of where the
 real power and influence lie. In a sense, too, this replicates interviews done
 in case studies in which researchers ask about who has influence, but it
 provides insight on a much broader scale. We are able to rank which groups
 JIGS organizations felt were the most powerful in Japan. We also are able to
 compare these rankings with similar ones from the JIGS surveys in Korea,
 Germany and the United States.
 The central bureaucracy was perceived as the most powerful entity in
 Japan, with an average score of 6.32 out of 7. Again, this is less central to the
 civil society literature's implied critique of the political economy literature
 but worth raising nonetheless. The bureaucracy's only real rivals were political
 parties (6.12). Women's groups were perceived as weakest (3.42), barely
 exceeded by the category of "nongovernmental [NGO] citizens' groups/
 residents' movement groups" (3.48) and welfare groups (3.49). Foreign
 governments were seen as powerful (5.18) , nearly the level of some significant
 domestic players such as agricultural groups (5.22), the mass media (5.32),
 big corporations (5.38) and economic groups and managers (5.65).
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 These rankings are interesting because they reflect the JIGS organizations'
 view of the world. However, they are also interesting in comparative
 perspective. Compared to the other three countries mentioned above,
 bureaucracy, agricultural organizations, foreign governments, international
 organizations and foreign interest groups were ranked much higher in Japan.
 Local government was ranked slightly higher or about the same in all four
 countries. Mass media, labour organizations, consumer groups, NGOs, civil
 organizations and citizens' movement organizations were ranked lower in
 Japan compared to the other three countries. Women's organizations and
 academics ranked slightly lower or about the same. Political parties, economic
 and business organizations, big firms and social welfare organizations in
 Japan were ranked at a similar position as in the other countries.
 This article has explored the interests, activities and success of interest
 groups and civil society organizations in influencing public policy making
 in Japan. Our goal is to place our findings in the context of systematic
 comparisons with noneconomic organizations and noneconomic ministries.
 The primary tool has been the quantitative data from the JIGS data. We
 found that compared to citizens' groups, the type of group most emblematic
 of "civil society," business organizations have much greater resources and
 access to policy making. Our evidence reinforces the picture of high levels
 of communication and interaction between business organizations and the
 economic bureaucracy. Recall, for example, that consultations between METI
 and economic, business or trade organizations were three times more than
 the sum of all consultations between all ministries and all citizens' groups,
 political groups and welfare groups. Our second main finding uncovered
 evidence that the bureaucracy remains a powerful actor in Japanese politics,
 at least according to the perception of civil society actors. The bureaucracy
 is also central in structuring the political relationships of civil society
 organizations. Although both our findings seem to support the analyses of
 the political economy literature, we repeat that we do not see civil society
 organizations as powerless or insignificant in Japanese politics. Rather, we
 focus on placing the aggregate strengths, contributions and influence of all
 sectors of civil society organizations in perspective.
 University ofTsukuba and University of Washington, July 2007
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